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Abstract
There is a paucity of research about how the policies enacted by
states either foster or hinder charter schools’ service to
disadvantaged students or how the characteristics of charter
schools themselves affect this outcome. By combining data from
the US Department of Education’s Schools and Staffing Survey
with data on the characteristics of state charter school policies,
this article examines how different types of charter schools
respond to the policy and market signals established by state
charter legislation, and the impact of such signals on the
willingness and ability of charter schools to serve disadvantaged
student populations. With a sample of 533 charter schools in 13
states, models are estimated to discern whether specific state
policies and whether being managed by two types of for-profit
educational management organizations (EMOs)—large and small
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ones—encourages or discourages schools from enrolling
low-income and minority students. The results suggest that
certain policy characteristics are important for encouraging
schools to serve low-income and minority students. Specifically,
having multiple chartering authorities and requiring the
transportation of students are important for explaining charter
schools’ service to low-income and minority students. Being
managed by a large-EMO was positively but not significantly
related to charter schools enrollment of low-income and minority
students. The results differed for small-EMO managed schools.
Small-EMOs served significantly lower percentages of minority
students. The results suggest that not all charter schools are the
same and that policy design and organizational form matters for
determining whom charter schools will serve.
We are at a crossroads in charter school policy and practice. We are more than
ten years from the first law, many state legislatures continue to make
amendments to their state charter school laws, and many schools across the
nation are having their charters come up for review and renewal. Thus the
moment is timely to examine equity issues in charter schools. Forty states and
the District of Columbia have enacted charter schools legislation. The extent of
charter school activity varies both between and within states. Characteristics of
charter schools legislation also vary greatly by states, providing enough natural
variation to examine patterns of charter schools service to disadvantaged
students. Unlike many education reforms, the charter school idea is a structural
reform, not a pedagogical one (Miron and Nelson 2002; Vergari 2002).
Proponents of charter schools and the legislators that have adopted variations
of this policy believe that by changing the structure within which schools
operate, numerous desirable outcomes, such as increased student
performance will occur. School choice is also increasingly important because it
is one of the cornerstones of the school accountability provisions of the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001. In addition to emphasizing choice as an
alternative to students in “failing” Title 1 schools, the federal budget for fiscal
year 2002 allocated $200 million in grants for “expanding the number of
high-quality charter schools available to students across the Nation” (No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001 § 5201(3)).
Proponents of charter schools argue that they will “provide havens for students
who have been poorly served by traditional public schools, promote parental
involvement and satisfaction, improve academic achievement, and save public
education” (Gill, Timpane et al. 2001, p. xii). The evidence regarding the ability
of charter schools to deliver on these promises is quite mixed. No study has
proved conclusively that the performance of charter school students is
substantially better (or worse) than that of students in traditional public schools.
The question of access for underserved populations has generally been
examined at an aggregated level. Aggregated at the national level, there tends
to be little difference between charter and traditional schools in terms of the
enrollment of minority and low-income students (RPP International 2000).
Though findings from state and local studies sometimes paint a different
portrait. For example, Gill et al. (2001) reported that in 11 out of 27 charter
school states, charter schools served a population that had significantly lower
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income than the state’s public school population, while in six out of 27 states the
opposite was true. With regard to racial and ethnic segregation in charter
schools, for example, Cobb and Glass (1999) found that nearly half of the
schools in Arizona displayed substantial ethnic segregation. But the research
has not yet examined how the policies enacted by states either foster or hinder
charter schools’ service to disadvantaged students or how the characteristics of
charter schools themselves affect this outcome. As charter schools continue to
proliferate, it is important to examine the equity implications of this policy and its
ability to improve the learning opportunities of the most vulnerable students in
the public school system. The aim of this research is to begin to fill part of this
information gap by examining how different types of charter schools respond to
the policy and market signals established by state charter legislation, and the
impact of such signals on the willingness and ability of charter schools to serve
disadvantaged student populations.

The Charter Schools Idea
Charter schools are an idea with several contested meanings and goals (Wells,
Grutzik et al. 1999). The founders of the charter movement viewed charter
schools as a structural reform that went beyond site-based management to
create independent schools that shatter the idea the a one-size fits all model
that predominates public school systems (Nathan 1996). But as policymakers
took up the idea, the market metaphor for choice and competition came to
dominate the discussion (Wells 2002). Thus, along with supply-side arguments
for charter schools (innovation, serving diverse needs, increased accountability,
etc) are market-based ideas of competition, parental choice and shopping for
schools.
The most ardent supporters of school choice base their support in ideas about
the operation of the market (Chubb and Moe 1990). Others base their support
in providing poor and minority children with options out of poor performing
neighborhood schools, in other reform ideas such as site-based management,
or in the idea that public schools fail to meet the needs of diverse students
(Nathan 1996; Peterson and Greene 1998; Peterson 1999). Much of the
discussion about charter schools, indeed, school choice in general, is based on
principles of microeconomic theory: that the private market can determine the
appropriate quantity and quality of a good by reaching an equilibrium between
consumers and producers that optimizes the utility of consumers and the profit
of producers. It is also based in the idea that the bureaucracy of governments
leads to ineffective and inefficient institutions (Chubb and Moe 1990). These
ideas are evident in the definition of charter schools provided by the Center for
Education Reform, a pro-charter and school choice organization:
Charter schools are independent public schools, designed and operated by
educators, parents, community leaders, educational entrepreneurs and others.
They are sponsored by designated local or state educational organizations who
monitor their quality and integrity, but allow them to operate freed from the
traditional bureaucratic and regulatory red tape that hog-ties public schools.
Freed from such micromanagement, charter schools design and deliver
programs tailored to educational excellence and community needs. Because
they are schools of choice, they are held to the highest level of accountability –
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consumer demand. (Center for Education Reform 2002)
Proponents of charter schools make numerous claims about the effect of the
increased autonomy and accountability that constitute the charter school idea.
They argue that autonomy and accountability will lead to schools that improve
student performance as measured by standardized test scores and other
measures; this will happen because if schools fail to improve student
performance and meet other goals as set out in their charter, then their
permission to operate can be revoked and/or parents will take their children out
of the school signaling a need to change (Nathan 1996). Proponents also
recognize that the very idea of charter schools raises equity issues, especially
surrounding race, class, and ability—about who will choose or get chosen,
about what they will be choosing, and who will be left behind. Some proponents
argue that charter schools can reduce class and racial segregation, which they
rightly point out is quite extensive in the traditional system, by dissolving the
geographic boundaries that result in schools that are reflective of the largely
racially and economically segregated neighborhoods in which they are located
(Peterson and Greene 1998; Hassel 1999; Viteritti 1999; Greene 2000). Others
suggest that allowing schools the autonomy to develop creative and different
programs is more equitable than trying to serve all children with similar schools
(Nathan 1996).
Those who are wary of school choice, however, fear that it will result in schools
selecting students rather than parents selecting schools (Rothstein 1998; Fiske
and Ladd 2000; Kahlenberg 2001). Opponents fear that the combination of
financial pressures of keeping costs low with the pressure of being increasingly
judged by academic performance will lead schools to select a student
population that is relatively easy and inexpensive to serve. Those who are wary
of choice are also concerned that many parents, especially low-income and
immigrant parents, may not have sufficient information to allow them effectively
use the mechanism of choice (Henig 1994; Rothstein 1998, Teske and
Schneider 2001). There is also some concern that the values and preferences
of racial and ethnic minorities may lead them to voluntarily segregate into
particular schools. Wells and her colleagues fear that charter schools policies
may result in the further isolation of disadvantaged communities and/or that
they will fail to redistribute resources to disadvantaged communities resulting in
the hardening of race and class hierarchies, thus reinforcing social inequalities
(Wells, Lopez et al. 1999).

Educational Management Organizations and Charter Schools
Most of the research about the impact of charter schools on social stratification
and equity treats them as a single class of institution and the results have been
mixed (Gill et al. 2001). But there are good reasons to believe that charter
schools vary greatly in their orientation to the market and in their missions.
Those with a strong orientation to the market tend to have ties to educational
management organizations (EMOs), but those that are more mission oriented
tend to focus on at-risk populations and often have ties to social service or
nonprofit organizations (Lacireno-Paquet, et al. 2002; Henig, et al. 2003). We
might expect different equity outcomes from different types of charter schools in
diverse policy and market environments. I believe that disaggregating charter
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schools according to their orientation to the market will provide a more nuanced
picture of charter schools overall.
Categorizing charter schools according to whether or not they are operated by a
for-profit educational management organization is one useful way to gauge
market orientation (Miron and Nelson 2002; Lacireno-Paquet, et al. 2002;
Brown, et al. 2003). This distinction is useful because while most states require
charter schools to take non-profit status as their legal form, most also allow
schools to enter into contracts with firms to manage schools and many are
choosing to do so. The literature on nonprofit organizations suggests that there
are important organizational distinctions between for- and non-profits (Weisbrod
1998; Frumkin and Andre-Clark 2000). While contracting with for-profits is not
new to education, what is new is the extent of the contracting arrangements,
with new firms sprouting to manage multiple schools across the country (Plank,
Arsen et al. 2000; Miron and Nelson 2002). Indeed, the founders of the charter
school movement did not envision corporate involvement in charter schools
(Nathan 1996).
The concern about EMOs is that the profit motive will lead firms to cut costs,
which may negatively affect educational quality and equity (Nelson, et al. 2000;
Plank, et al. 2000; Miron and Nelson 2002). To date, only one large-EMO
working with charter schools has reported a profit and that is a Michigan based
firm called National Heritage Academies (NHA). However, the increasing
number of EMOs operating charters schools, “suggests that many more
anticipate that profits are just over the horizon” (Miron and Nelson 2002: p.170).
There is some evidence that EMO-managed schools tend to serve a different
population than mission oriented or more independent schools—one that is less
disadvantaged and less expensive to serve (Miron and Nelson 2002;
Lacireno-Paquet, et al. 2002).
In their review of school choice outcomes, Teske and Schneider (2001) suggest
that stratification in terms of race and class “is the most important question
related to school choice” (p. 624). Stratification, they suggest, can be controlled,
to some extent, by the institutional mechanisms of forms of choice that are
implemented. More importantly, we need to understand the relationship
between organizational characteristics of the schools, like EMO-management
status, and the types of students served because policymakers can control
whether schools are permitted to contract with EMOs and the terms of such
contracts.

The Importance of State Policies
While charter schools can be thought of as a single policy innovation, the way
they have been designed and implemented varies from state to state. Studies
have shown that certain dimensions of charter school legislation can be
important for the emergence of charter schools (Buckley and Kuscova 2003;
Witte, Shober et al. 2003). Among the dimensions of variation in state charter
school policy regimes that may be important for determining charter schools
service to disadvantaged students include: (1) funding; (2) transportation; (3)
the number and type of schools permitted; and (4) the number and type of
chartering authorities.
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Funding is perhaps the most important policy characteristic because the
structure of funding formulas creates incentives and disincentives for charter
schools to target particular types of students. Generous formulas not
differentiated by grade level or not targeted to the types of student served might
lead some schools to target high achieving and low-cost students, especially by
those schools hoping to earn a profit because a greater profit can be extracted
from a fixed per-pupil allotment if easier and/or less expensive students are
served (Plank, et al. 2000; Miron and Nelson 2002). Alternatively, targeted or
progressive funding formulas, where schools are reimbursed for additional
services, may entice charter operators to target these groups and lead to more
equitable service. Funding structures for charter schools are directly under the
control of state legislators thus it is important to understand how different
funding structures affect equity.
Transportation of students is an important policy variable in understanding how
charter schools serve disadvantaged students. If transportation is a family
responsibility, it may act as a barrier to low-income families from exercising their
choice options. Low-income families may not have the resources (time and/or
money) to transport their children to schools, which may be located far from
their homes. In states where the transportation of charter students is required,
states usually require that either the charter school or the host school district
provide it.
In terms of the number of schools permitted, a cap on the total number of
charter schools allowed could restrict their impact on traditional schools.
Permitting only a small number of schools may actually impede true
competition, a key part of the charter concept. While policymakers may try to
manage the competition potentially introduced by charter schools, for example,
by restricting the total number of schools, these types of policies may result in
artificial constraints on the market with unintended consequences for access.
Some charter school policies allow only one set of actors, such as local school
districts to grant charters. Others allow a wider variety of public actors to do so.
Michigan, for example, permits state universities, community colleges,
intermediate and local school districts to grant charters. Buckley and Kuscova
(2003) find that:
The institutional environment that states create for their school choice initiatives
(or, more accurately, the environment created by political conflict and
compromise) can have a profound effect on the performance of policies and
programs, including market-based reforms. In our examination of the effect of
charter school legislation on market share, we find that one particular set of
provisions regarding who can grant charters has a substantial effect on their
share of a market for education (p.16).
The number and types of actors that can grant charters also likely influences
the types of schools that get approved and can also affect the issue of
stratification. Local school districts have been wary of authorizing charter
schools, which they see as their competitors (Hassel 1999). Some authorizers,
such as the university authorizers in Michigan, have favored granting charters to
schools that partner with EMOs but school district authorizers there have the
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opposite tendency (Miron and Nelson 2002).

Research Questions
Empirical evidence about charter schools and the surrounding public school
districts can be used to answer questions about whether the market will
exacerbate or ameliorate race and class based segregation in certain policy
environments. Here I begin to address these questions by examining how
different types of charter schools–specifically EMO and non-EMO operated
schools—respond to the policy and market signals established by state charter
legislation and how this affects their service to disadvantaged student
populations (Note 1). By combining data on state charter school laws with data
from the 1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), a National Center for
Education Statistics survey, I begin to discern important variations in policy
features and in charter school organizational characteristics that influence
charter schools service to disadvantaged students. Finding that different policy
characteristics and/or school organizational characteristics are associated with
the under-serving or under-enrollment of traditionally disadvantaged students
would suggest policy alternatives to manage competition while safeguarding the
public values of equity and choice.

Data and Methods
The data for this research come from multiple sources. School level data on
charter schools and data on the districts in which these schools are located
(“host districts”) come from the 1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Survey. The
SASS is a periodic survey conducted by the National Center for Education
Statistics of the US Department of Education. SASS included a charter school
component for the first time in the 1999-2000 data collection, when the
population of charter schools was surveyed. The SASS also included a sample
of public school districts from each state in the nation. Using the Common Core
of Data, a yearly census survey of schools and districts in the nation, I used
charter school zip codes to identify the host districts for all charter schools
responding to the SASS. Because districts were only sampled, not all charter
school host districts were included in the SASS. About half of the host districts
were identified, but these represented the host districts of more than 78 percent
of all of the charter schools in the sample. Only charter schools with host
districts identified were included in this analysis. These school and district level
data form the base of the analysis file. After excluding schools in states that did
not have an EMO operated school responding to the survey, 587 schools in 13
states remained in the analysis file. (Note 2) Another 54 schools with missing
data for the dependent variables were excluded, resulting in 533 charter
schools in 216 districts being included in the analysis. Table 1 lists the states
that were included in this study, as well as the number of charter schools
responding to the SASS in the 1999-2000 school year, and the number of host
districts identified in SASS.
Table 1. States in Analysis Sample
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State

Total
Number of
Number
Charter
of
Schools
Charter Responding to
Schools
SASS
(1999-2000)

Number of
Charter
Schools
with Host
Districts

Year
Charter
School
Legislation
Passed

Identified*
(Sample)

Arizona

180

173

115

1994

California

154

113

84

1992

Colorado

60

52

36

1993

District of
Columbia

19

16

15

1996

Florida

72

59

57

1996

Illinois

20

10

10

1996

Massachusetts

34

27

16

1993

Michigan

131

119

72

1993

Minnesota

38

29

24

1991

New Jersey

30

24

10

1996

North Carolina

56

42

29

1996

Pennsylvania

31

23

14

1997

Texas

109

71

51

1996

Total

914

748

533

* Excludes charter schools with missing data for the number of FARL-eligible
and minority students.
Sources: RPP International 2000; Authors calculations using the 1999-2000
Schools and Staffing Survey Data.
Data on the characteristics of state charter school legislation come from two
sources, both commissioned by the US Department of Education. Data on the
financial aspects of state charter legislation comes from Nelson, Muir and
Drown’s (2000) Venturesome Capital and data on the caps and other
non-financial characteristics are from RPP International’s (1999) A Comparison
of Charter School Legislation. Table 2 below tabulates the number of states in
this study having each policy variable of interest.
Variables included in the models come from the state, district, and school
levels. Each level and the variables included are explicated in more detail
below. OLS regression models with schools clustered by their host district were
estimated for the percent of students eligible for Free and Reduced Price Lunch
(Note 3) and the percent of minority students in charter schools. (Note 4) Each
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model will be discussed in detail below.
Table 2: Frequency of State Policy Characteristics
Number (Percent)
of States Without
Policy Feature

Number (Percent)
of States With
Policy Feature

Cap on number of charter
schools in state

6
(46.15)

7
(53.85)

Multiple Authorizers

7
(53.85)

6
(46.15)

State Level Authorizer
Only

11
(84.61)

2
(15.38)

Local School District
Authorizers Only

9
(69.23)

4
(30.77)

Funding for Charter
Schools Varies by Grade
Levels Served

6
(46.15)

7
(53.85)

State Provides Funding
for At-Risk or Low-Income
Students

4
(30.77)

9
(69.23)

Transportation Not
Required for Charter
Students

7
(53.85)

6
(46.15)

Policy

Sources: RPP International 1999; Nelson, Muir et al. 2000

State Policy Characteristics
As noted above, some of the significant dimensions of variation in state charter
school policy regimes represented by variables in the model include: (1)
funding; (2) transportation; (3) number of schools permitted; and (4) number
and types of chartering authorities. More specifically, the funding variables
included in the models are whether the state provides additional funding for
at-risk or low-income students and another to indicate whether funding varies by
the grade levels served. A variable is included to indicate whether transportation
of charter students is required (either by the school or the district).
Another variable is included to indicate whether or not a state has a cap on the
number of charter schools permitted. Also, a variable is included to indicate
whether the state has multiple chartering authorities compared to having only
one authorizer. In cases where there is only one chartering authority, it is
usually local school districts, though a few states have a state-level charter
authorizing board or agency. States with multiple authorities usually allow local
school districts and other, usually state level, entities to charter schools, such as
public universities or state boards of education.
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District Characteristics
Characteristics of the local school district in which charter schools are located
are also important because they affect both whether and what types of charter
school are likely to operate in a district and what charter schools are likely to do
in terms of targeting students once they open. Important explanatory variables
at this level include the percentage of students in the district who are eligible for
the federal Free and Reduced Price Lunch (FARL) program and the percentage
of minority students (all calculated excluding charter schools) because they are
populations considered at-risk for educational failure or considered underserved
by traditional schools. These variables are also important because charter
schools primarily draw students from their host district and consequently their
enrollments may be strongly influenced by the composition of student
population of their districts. Miron, Neslon, and Risley (2002) found, for
example, that the average charter school student in Pennsylvania travels 5.5
miles to attend a charter school. A variable for the size of the district (measured
as the natural log of total district enrollment) was included to control for the size
of the market in which a charter school operates.

School Characteristics
The main school level variable that is predicted to influence charter school
service to disadvantaged students is charter school type. (Note 5) Charter
schools are disaggregated into schools managed by large-EMOs—defined as
those managing 10 or more schools—and those managed by
small-EMOs—defined as those managing at least three but fewer than 10
schools. The category ‘large-EMO’ includes the following for-profit management
firms in existence at the time of the SASS data collection: Advantage, Beacon,
Edison, Leona, Mosaica, National Heritage Academies, and SABIS.
Small-EMOs include firms such as Smart Schools, Inc., Designs for Learning,
and others similar private, for-profit firms that operate fewer than 10 schools,
usually in only one state. These two EMO categories are contrasted against the
excluded category of non-EMO managed charter schools. The differences in
market oriented and more independent charter schools are important because
each type is likely to respond differently to both the policy environment and the
market for education in terms of where they locate, the programs they offer, and
the students they serve.
Other variables that may affect a school’s service to disadvantaged students
include whether the school is specifically for at-risk students, whether the school
has admissions criteria, whether the school requires parents to volunteer, and
the age of the school. The grade levels offered by a school (elementary,
elementary/middle, and high school) are also controlled for in the models in
order to see whether the patterns are different by grade level. School size is
controlled for by including a variable of the total number of students enrolled in
the school. The urban location of schools is also controlled for. Charter schools
in this sub-sample are all rather urban but a variable is used to indicate whether
the school is located in the central city of a large or mid-sized city. (Note 6)
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Results
As noted above each dependent variable of interest was modeled as a function
of school, district, and state policy characteristics. Variables are defined in
Table 3. The basic model is shown below. For a school i in district j and state k:
(Note 7)
% subgroupijk = f (schoolijk characteristics, districtjk characteristics, statek policy
characteristics)
Table 3: Variable Definitions
Variable Name

Definition

Minority Enrollment

The percent of students who are Black,
Hispanic, American Indian or Alaska Native
American; continuous variable.

Percent FARL-eligible
Students in School

Percent of K-12 plus ungraded students who
are eligible to participate in the Free and
Reduced Price Lunch Program; continuous
variable.

Large-EMO-managed
School

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if school is
operated by a large Educational
Management Organization (one that
operates 10 or more charter schools).

Small-EMO-managed
School

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if school is
operated by a small Educational
Management Organization (one that
operates at least 3 but fewer than 10 charter
schools).

Non-EMO Charter School

Omitted variable. Reference category which
includes all charter schools not managed by
an EMO.

At-Risk School

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if school is
exclusively for at-risk or expelled students or
those involved in the criminal justice system

Admissions Criteria

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the school
uses one or more admissions criteria (such
as standardized test scores) for admissions
decisions

Number of Years in
Operation

Continuous variable indicating the total
number of years a school has been offering
classes as a charter school.

Total Enrollment

Total number of students in grades K-12 and
any ungraded students
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Parents Required to
Volunteer

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the school
requires parents to volunteer some amount
of time at the school as a requirement for
student enrollment.

Middle School

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the school
exclusively serves the middle school grades.

High School

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the school
exclusively serves the high school grades.

Other Grades

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the school
serves other or combined grade
configurations (i.e. k-12).

Elementary Grades

Omitted category to which other grade levels
are compared.

School Located in Central
City of Large or Mid-Sized
City

Dichotomous variables equals 1 if the school
is located in the central city of a large or
mid-sized city, as compared to the urban
fringe of a city or rural areas.

District Percent Minority

Percent of K-12 plus ungraded students in a
district who are Black, Hispanic, Native
American or Alaska Native; Continuous
variable.

District Percent
FARL-eligible

Percent of K-12 plus ungraded students in a
district who are eligible for the Free and
Reduced Lunch Program; continuous
variable.

Log of District Enrollment

Natural log of total number of students
enrolled in the host district.

Cap

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if state policy
includes a limit or cap on the number of
charter schools allowed statewide.

Multiple Authorizers

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if state policy
allows more than one type of agency to
grant charters. Contrasted against policy that
allows only one authorizer (either state or
local school districts).

Funding Varies by Grade
Level

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the state
policy includes a funding formula that varies
the per pupil amount by the grade level of
the student.

State Funds for At-Risk

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the state
provides additional funds for at-risk or
low-income students in addition to any
federal funds for which a school may be
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eligible.
Transportation not required Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the state
policy does not specify or require that either
the charter school or the host district provide
transportation to charter school students.
The results of each estimated model are described below. Tables 4 and 5 show
the means and standard deviations for continuous variables, and the tabulations
for the dummy variables. Table 6 presents the results of the multivariate
regressions.
Table 4: Tabulations for Variables of Interest
Variable

Number of
Schools

Total Number of EMO-managed Schools

69

Number of Large-EMO-managed Schools

49

Number of Small-EMO-managed Schools

23

Number of Non-EMO-managed Schools

464

Number of Schools for At-Risk or Expelled Students or
Students who Dropped Out

30

Number of Schools with Admissions Criteria

138

Number of Schools Requiring Parents to Volunteer

236

Number of Elementary Schools

278

Number of Middle Schools

46

Number of High Schools

115

Number of Schools Serving Other Grades, or Other
Grade Configurations

94

Number of Schools in Central City of Large or Mid-Sized
Central Cities

347

Table 5: Table of Means and Standard Deviations
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum Maximum

Percent FARL-eligible in school 50.54

31.32

0.22 - 100

Minority Enrollment

59.15

35.36

0 - 100

Years in Operation

2.61

1.54

1-8

Total Enrollment

290.13 326.12

Full Sample (N= 533)
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12 – 2,653

Log of District Enrollment

10.24

1.59

5.30 – 13.47

District Percent FARL-eligible
students (N=532)

46.05

21.76

0.57 - 100

District Percent minority
students

56.58

29.99

0.39 – 99.92

Percent FARL-eligible in school 49.96

31.62

0.22 - 100

Minority Enrollment

58.66

35.42

0 - 100

Years in Operation

2.69

1.57

1–8

Log of District Enrollment

10.24

1.61

5.30 – 13.47

District Percent FARL-eligible
students (N=463)

45.44

22.35

0.57 – 100

District Percent minority
students

55.75

30.08

0.39 – 99.92

Percent FARL-eligible in school 63.00

26.97

1.82 - 100

Minority Enrollment

68.20

34.14

1.54 – 100

Years in Operation

1.85

0.92

1–4

Log of District Enrollment

10.04

1.32

7.57 – 12.93

District Percent FARL-eligible
students

51.60

16.31

11.85 – 86.45

District Percent minority
students

62.23

28.51

3.71 – 99.40

Percent FARL-eligible in school 50.16

26.77

6.52 - 94.34

Minority Enrollment

50.98

34.62

3 – 100

Years in Operation

2.35

1.37

1–6

Log of District Enrollment

10.56

1.67

6.57 – 12.37

District Percent FARL-eligible
students

47.37

18.11

8.95 – 79.94

District Percent minority
students

61.98

30.58

8.77 – 95.74

Non-EMO managed Schools (N= 464)

Large-EMO-Managed Schools (N= 23)

Small-EMO-Managed Schools (N=23)

Table 6: OLS Regression With Robust Standard Errors, Clustered by
Host District
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Variable

Percent of
Percent of
FARL-eligible Students minority students
in School
in School

School Level Variables
Large-EMO school

4.49
(4.57)

3.94
(3.40)

Small-EMO School

-0.30
(5.66)

-10.44**
(3.90)

Non-EMO Charter School

Omitted

Omitted

School for at-risk students
only

11.81
(6.50)

-1.34
(4.64)

Admission Criteria

-5.85*
(2.87)

-1.92
(3.22)

Parents Required to
Volunteer

-3.77
(2.95)

2.35
(2.59)

Number of Years in
Operation

1.12
(0.99)

-0.20
(0.78)

Middle School Grades Only

-0.94
(5.19)

2.11
(4.68)

High School Grades Only

-3.52
(2.80)

-0.33
(2.57)

Combined Grades

2.64
(3.68)

-0.87
(3.29)

Elementary Grades

Omitted

Omitted

Total Enrollment

-0.005
(0.004)

0.003
(0.003)

School Located in Central
City of Large or Mid-sized
City

6.35*
(3.15)

5.70
(3.37)

0.45***
(0.06)

--

Percent Minority in District

--

0.72***
(0.05)

Log of District Enrollment

0.54
(1.01)

0.18
(0.96)

-1.57
(3.43)

-5.40*
(2.74)

District Level Variables
Percent FARL-Eligible in
District

State Level Policy Variables
Cap on Number of Schools
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Multiple Authorizers

17.79***
(4.86)

14.11***
(3.33)

Funding Varies by Grade
Level Served

-5.60
(4.15)

-5.50
(2.92)

State Funding for At-risk
Students

5.98
(5.39)

1.21
(3.24)

-22.29***
(4.84)

-19.89***
(3.85)

23.40
(10.29)

20.47
(10.08)

Number of Observations

532

533

Number of Clusters

215

216

F Statistic

F (18, 214) = 9.99***

F (18, 215) =
48.91***

R-Squared

0.2156

0.5102

Transportation Not
Required
Constant
Constant
Model Properties

Note: Standard error in parentheses. * p≤.05, ** p≤ .01, *** p≤ 0.001

Percent of Free and Reduced Lunch Eligible Students
The average percentage of students eligible for Free and Reduced Lunch, in all
charter schools combined, is 50.54 percent, but there are differences by school
type. For EMO-managed schools as a group the average is 56.52 percent, for
large-EMO-managed schools it is 63.00 percent and 50.16 percent for
small-EMO-managed schools. For all other charter schools the average is 49.96
percent. Do these patterns of FARL-eligible enrollment hold in a multivariate
analysis?
The multivariate regression is significant overall, with an F-statistic of 9.99. The
model explains a fair amount of variation in our dependent variable (R-squared
0.2156), the percentage of FARL-eligible students in a school. The coefficient
on the variable indicating management by a large-EMO is positive but not
statistically significant, suggesting no difference in FARL-eligible enrollment
between large-EMO and non-EMO operated charter schools. Small-EMO
charter schools also do not enroll significantly different percentages of
FARL-eligible students, when controlling for all of the other variables. Only two
school level variables reach statistical significance: having admissions criteria
and urban location. Schools that have admission requirements tend to enroll a
lower percentage of FARL-eligible students, indicated by the significant
coefficient of –5.85. Charter schools in urban areas enroll about 6.35
percentage points more FARL-eligible students, all else constant.
One district characteristic variable is important in explaining the variation in the
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percent of FARL-eligible students in charter schools. The coefficient (0.45) ,
though small, suggests that the higher the percentage of FARL-eligible students
in the district, the higher the percentage in charter schools. It is not surprising
that, all else constant, the percentage of FARL-eligible students in a districts is
related to the percentage of FARL-eligible students in charter schools as
charters likely draw most of their students from the district in which they are
located.
The variables representing state policy characteristics present some interesting
results. While only two of the variables have significant coefficients, the
magnitudes are strikingly large. Having multiple chartering authorities, as
opposed to only one type of authorizer—usually a state level agency or local
school districts—is positively and significantly related to the percentage of
FARL-eligible students served in a school; the coefficient of 17.79 suggests that
schools in states with multiple charter authorities enroll about 18 percentage
points more Free and Reduced Lunch-eligible students than schools in states
with only one authorizer. There has been speculation that local school districts
are wary of authorizing charter schools that they see as competitors and so
when they do authorize a charter school, it is usually for a school with a special
program or serving a special population, which may not encourage service to
low-income students.
Not surprisingly, the variable indicating that the transportation of charter school
students (either by the schools or districts) is not required was also significant
but with a large negative effect on the percentage of low-income students in a
school, with a coefficient of –22.29. Schools located in states that do not require
the transportation of students to charter schools enroll about 22 percentage
points fewer low-income students than schools in states that do require
transportation of charter students.

Minority Enrollment
Minority enrollment in charter schools averages about 59.15 percent.
Enrollment, however, varies greatly by charter school type. Minority students
comprise about 68.20 percent of large-EMO managed schools but only 50.98
percent of small-EMO managed schools. The minority enrollment of non-EMO
charter schools falls in between at 58.66 percent. Again, the multivariate
analysis is performed to see whether these differences remain when policy
variables, and other school and district variables are taken into account.
Minority enrollment is defined as the percentage of all students in a school who
are Asian or Pacific Islander, Black or African American, Hispanic, or Native
American or Alaska Native, or the percentage of non-White students. This
model was estimated similarly to the model of FARL-eligibility except with a
variable controlling for the percent of minority students in the host district. The
model is significant overall with an F-statistic of 48.91 and an R-squared of
0.5102.
With regard to the school level variables, we see that EMO status is important
for explaining the variation in minority enrollment. Charter schools managed by
small-EMO firms enroll a significantly lower percentage of minority students,
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about 10 percentage points lower, even controlling for the other school, district,
and state policy variables. No other school level variables are significant in this
model.
At the district level the variable controlling for the minority enrollment of the host
district is significant. The coefficient of 0.72 suggests that as the minority
enrollment of a charter school’s host district increases, so too does that of the
charter school. This is not surprising given the fact that charter schools tend to
draw most of their students from their surrounding host district.
In this model, the state level policy variables also present dramatic results.
Consistent with the FARL-eligible model above, the variables multiple
authorizers and not requiring transportation have large and significant
coefficients. Additionally, the variable having a cap on the total number of
charter schools has a significant and negative coefficient. The coefficient of
–5.40 suggests that schools in states with caps have minority enrollments that
are about 5 percentage points lower than those in states without caps. The
coefficient on multiple authorizers is 14.11 suggesting that this policy
characteristic plays a large role in encouraging charter schools to enroll minority
students. Again, we find that not requiring transportation has a large negative
effect. In this case, not requiring the transportation of charter school students
reduces the percent of minority students in charter schools by about 20 points
compared to schools in states that require transportation, all else constant.

Conclusions
The findings presented here suggest that certain policy characteristics are
important for encouraging all types of charter schools to enroll low-income and
minority students. Most notably, having multiple authorizers, rather than only
local school districts or only state level authorizers, and requiring the
transportation of charter school students appear to lead schools to serve higher
percentages of FARL-eligible and minority students. Diverse chartering
authorities are likely to authorize diverse types of schools across a state,
whereas the biases and preferences of a single authorizing body are likely to
dictate the types of schools that open. In states where local school districts are
the only authorizers, for example, districts may be wary of the competition
brought by charter schools or they may use charter schools as a place to
channel more difficult or expensive to serve students. Policymakers need to
realize that their choice of charter authorizers will influence the types of
students served by charter schools.
States where transportation for charter school students is not required, not
surprisingly, keeps the percentage of FARL-eligible and minority students lower
than in schools in states where some kind of transportation of charter students
is required. Indeed, it has been a concern of those wary of school choice that
transportation would be a barrier to low-income families to execute their choice
options. Low-income families may not have the resources (time and/or money)
to transport their children to schools, which may be located far from their
homes. Policymakers concerned about access to charter schools need to
ensure that the transportation of charter school students is provided.
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The organizational form of the school—that is association with a large or
small-EMO—appears to be important in explaining a school’s service to minority
students. Disaggregating the category of EMO operated schools into large- and
small-EMOs proved to be important because the patterns were not consistent
between the two types of firms. Large-EMOs, for instance, do not serve
significantly higher or lower percentages of low-income and minority students
than all other types of charter schools. But schools managed by small-EMO
schools served much lower percentages of minority students than all other
charter schools.

Policy Implications
Policy matters for who gets served by charter schools and the devil is indeed in
the details. Policymakers, educational professionals, and interested citizens
need to be thoughtful and deliberate about the kinds of charter schools they
want. If equity concerns are the most prominent, then policymakers need to be
sure those aspects of the law dealing with the authorization of schools,
transportation, and others, have the desired effects.
The results for EMO operated schools are mixed. Large-EMOs do not appear to
under- or over-enroll low-income and minority students whereas small-EMO
operated charter schools enroll significantly lower percentages of minority
students. But recall that the data used in this study are cross-sectional and it is
important to monitor the constantly evolving charter school landscape to
determine if the findings reported here become trends or not. The number of
EMOs is growing, as is the number of schools they operate, and the number of
students they serve. Indeed, six of the largest EMOs (Charter Schools USA,
Chancellor Beacon Academies, Edison Schools Inc., Mosaica, National
Heritage Academies, and White Hat Management) recently formed a
Washington, DC based interest group called the National Council of Education
Providers (National Council 2004). The organization plans to use its collective
clout as the employers of more than 14,000 employees and the educators of
more than 140,000 students in 24 states to increase public funds for charter
schools and to influence state and federal legislation affecting charter schools
(Archer 2004). In this analysis, only about 8 percent of the charter schools are
EMO-operated. It remains to be seen what will happen if EMOs come to
manage more and more charter schools. Policymakers have the power to
decide whether EMOs can operate in their state. School founders also have
control over the organizational form they choose, including partnering with
for-profit EMOs. School leaders need to think about their missions and goals in
designing their schools, and policymakers need to think about the purposes and
goals of the reform in designing or amending the policy.

Acknowledgment
This research was supported by a grant from the American Educational
Research Association which receives funds for its “AERA Grants Program” from
the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics,
and the Institute for Education Sciences, and the National Science Foundation
under NSF Grant #REC-9980573. Opinions reflect those of the author and do

19 of 27

not necessarily reflect those of the granting agencies. The author would like to
thank the anonymous reviewers, as well as Jeffrey Henig, Christopher Nelson,
and Linda Renzulli for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The author is
responsible for any errors presented here. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at the Annual Research Conference of the Association for Public
Policy and Management, November 7-9, 2002, Dallas, TX.

References
Archer, Jeff (2004). Private Charter Managers Team Up. Education Week, 23(21), 1, 15 (February 4,
2004).
Brown, H., J.R. Henig, N. Lacireno-Paquet, T.T. Holyoke, and M. Moser (2003). Scale of Operations
and Locus of Control in Market- vs. Mission-Oriented Charter Schools.
Buckley, J. and S. Kuscova (2003). The Effects of Institutional Variation on Policy Outcomes: The
Case of Charter Schools in the States. NY, Teacher's College, Columbia University, National
Center for the Study of Privatization in Education: Occasional Paper #79.
Chubb, J. E. and T. M. Moe (1990). Politics, Markets, and America's Schools. Washington, DC,
Brookings Institution Press.
Cobb, C. D. and G. V. Glass (1999). Ethnic Segregation in Arizona Charter Schools. Education
Policy Analysis Archives, 7(1). Retrieved June 15, 2004, from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v7n1/.
Fiske, E. B. and H. F. Ladd (2000). When Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale. Washington, DC,
Brookings Institution Press.
Frumkin, P. and A. Andre-Clark (2000). When Missions, Markets, and Politics Collide: Values and
Strategies in the Nonprofit Human Services. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29(1,
Supplement), 141-163.
Gill, B. P., P. M. Timpane, et al. (2001). Rhetoric Versus Reality: What we Know and What We Need
to Know About Vouchers and Charter Schools. Santa Monica, CA, RAND.
Greene, J. P. (2000). Why School Choice Can Promote Integration. Education Week, 19(31), 72, 52.
Hassel, B. C. (1999). The Charter School Challenge. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press.
Henig, J. R., T. T. Holyoke, et al. (2003). Privatization, Politics, and Urban Services: The Political
Behavior of Charter Schools. Journal of Urban Affairs, 25(1), 37-54.
Henig, J. R. (1994). Rethinking School Choice: Limits of the Market Metaphor. Princeton, NJ,
Princeton University Press.
Kahlenberg, R. D. (2001). All Together Now: Creating Middle-Class Schools through Public School
Choice. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press.
Lacireno-Paquet, N., T. T. Holyoke, et al. (2002). Creaming versus Cropping: Charter School
Enrollment Practices in Response to Market Incentives. Educational Evaluation and Policy
Analysis, 24(2), 145-158.
Miron, G. and C. Nelson (2002). What's Public about Charter Schools? Lessons Learned About
Choice and Accountability. Thousand Oaks, CA, Corwin Press, Inc.
Miron, G., C. Neslon, and J. Risley. 2002. Strengthening Pennsylvania's Charter School Reform:
Findings from the Statewide Evaluation and Discussion of Relevant Policy Issues. Vol. 2003: The
Evaluation Center, Western Michigan University.
Nathan, J. (1996). Charter Schools: Creating Hope and Opportunity for American Education. San
Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers.
National Council of Education Providers (2004). Internet Homepage. Retrieved February 2, 2004

20 of 27

from http://www.educationproviders.org.
Nelson, F. H., E. Muir, et al. (2000). Venturesome Capital: State Charter School Finance Systems.
Washington, DC, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of
Education.
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 § 5201(3)
Peterson, P. and J. P. Greene (1998). Race Relations & Central City Schools: It's time for an
Experiment with Vouchers. Brookings Review, 16(2), 33-37.
Peterson, P. (1999). A Liberal Case for Vouchers. The New Republic, 221(14), 29-30.
Plank, D. N., D. Arsen, et al. (2000). Charter Schools and Private Profits. The School Administrator
(Web Edition): 1-9.
Reform, Center for Education (2002). Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Charter
Schools.
Rothstein, R. (1998). “Charter Conundrum.” The American Prospect, 9(39).
RPP International (1999). A Comparison of Charter School Legislation: Thirty Three States and the
District of Columbia Incorporating Changes Through October, 1998, U.S. Department of
Education.
RPP International (2000). The State of Charter Schools 2000: Fourth Year Report. Washington, DC,
Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S./ Department of Education.
Teske, P. and M. Schneider (2001). What Research Can Tell Policymakers about School Choice.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 20(4), 609-631.
Vergari, S., Ed. (2002). The Charter School Landscape. Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh
Press.
Viteritti, J. P. (1999). Choosing Equality: School Choice, the Constitution, and Civil Society.
Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press.
Weisbrod, B. A. (1998). Institutional Form and Institutional Behavior. Private Action and the Public
Good. W. W. Powell and E. S. Clemens. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press: 69-84.
Wells, A. S., C. Grutzik, et al. (1999). Underlying Policy Assumptions of Charter school Reform: The
Multiple Meanings of a Movement. Teachers College Record 100(3): 513-535.
Wells, A. S., A. Lopez, et al. (1999). Charter Schools as Postmodern Paradox: Rethinking Social
Stratification in an Age of Deregulated School Choice. Harvard Educational Review 69(2):
172-204.
Wells, A. S., Ed. (2002). Where Charter School Policy Fails: The Problems of Accountability and
Equity. Sociology of Education. New York, Teachers College Press.
Witte, J. F., A. F. Shober, et al. (2003). Analyzing State Charter School Laws and Their Influence on
the Formation of Charter Schools in the United States. Paper prepared for the American Political
Science Association 2003 Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, PA.

About the Author
Natalie Lacireno-Paquet
The George Washington University
805 21st Street NW, Suite 601
Washington, DC 20052
Email: lacpaq@gwu.edu
Natalie Lacireno-Paquet recently received her Ph.D. in Public Policy from The

21 of 27

George Washington University. Her research interests include the equity
implications of education reform, specifically school choice policies, and the role
of management companies in public education.

Notes
1. While “service to disadvantaged students” is a multifaceted concept, in
this paper I examine just one facet—access. Other related and perhaps
more important facets of service include examination of the quality of the
schools attended by disadvantaged students, as well as their achievement
in their schools of choice.
2. The excluded states are Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas, Ohio, and
Wisconsin.
3. Eligibility for the Free and Reduced Price Lunch Program is used as a
proxy for low-income status.
4. BRR-based standard errors are the recommended method of the
National Center for Education Statistics for use with the SASS data
because they adjust standard errors to account for nonresponse and for
the complex design of the SASS. However, because the charter schools
were selected with certainty the use of the weights associated with the
BRR method are unnecessary. Moreover, because the assumption that
the error terms are independent is violated (84 of the school districts have
more than one charter school), I corrected for the correlated error terms
by clustering charter schools in their host districts, using the robust cluster
option in STATA.
5. Here EMO is defined as firm that offers comprehensive school
management services in three or more schools (see Bulkley 2001). This
definition will exclude those EMOs that were set up to manage one
particular school, such as some EMOs in Michigan where school leaders
incorporated to avoid participation in the state teacher’s retirement plan.
6. A caveat is important here because while this article looks at what types
of students are served by charter schools it is important to note that there
is difficulty in distinguishing between the effects of which parents are
choosing charter schools and which students are chosen by charter
schools. States do not allow charter schools to discriminate, but some
states allow charter schools to specify geographic boundaries for service,
specify admissions criteria or to give siblings preference or to give the
children of founders and staff preference over others who may want to
attend, and these could allow schools to actively shape their student
populations. Additionally, charters may influence their student populations
through the way they advertise or describe their offerings.
7. While the nested nature of the data (charter schools in districts in
states) appears to be a natural fit for Hierarchical Linear Modeling
techniques, the peculiarities of this dataset did not permit it. First, there
was not enough variation in some of the key variables at the different
levels of analysis. For example, some states have fewer than 5 EMO
operated schools, making the estimation of coefficients for these variables
unreliable or even impossible. Second, some districts have only one
charter school, and few have 5 or more, making the technical estimation
at this level impossible.
8. Because the BRR-based standard errors are the preferred method of
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the NCES, I want to note the results of the model using the BRR-based
standard errors are somewhat different, though not contradictory. Using
the BRR standard errors, a number of additional variables become
significant, including large-EMO (3.89), and all of the policy variables. The
coefficients of variables that were significant in the cluster analysis remain
significant with virtually identical magnitudes in the BRR-based standard
errors model. The results of this model are available upon request from
the author.
9. Again, for comparison purposes, I want to note the differences and
similarities with results for the same model but using BRR-based standard
errors. In the BRR model, the standard errors tend to be smaller and thus
more variables reach statistical significance. While all of the variables in
the cluster analysis remain significant, with virtually identical coefficients,
variables that are newly significant include: parental service requirement
(2.33), total enrollment (0.003), and funding varies by grade level (-5.58).
The results of this model are available upon request from the author.
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